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TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE SECTION
27.01: AN ALTERNATIVE TO FEDERAL
SECURITIES FRAUD REMEDIES
by J Warren Huff
Federal regulation of transactions in securities has expanded enor-
mously since enactment of the federal securities acts.' A significant por-
tion of this expansion has resulted from the courts' implication of private
damage actions and their application of this remedy to an ever-expanding
class of transactions. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have
evidenced concern over these developments and have operated to curtail
the expansion of the scope of protection afforded by the federal securities
laws.2 Part I of this Comment illustrates this recent trend with respect to
private damage actions through an analysis of several Supreme Court de-
cisions under Securities and Exchange Commission rule lOb-5 and con-
cludes that the decreasing availability of federal remedies should result in
an increased reliance on the remedies provided by state law.
There are essentially three state law remedies for securities fraud avail-
able in Texas: the common law fraud action, section 33 of the Texas Se-
curities Act,3 and section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code.4 Of these potential avenues of relief, section 27.01 has been the least
used. This statute was initially enacted in 1919,5 and was designed to cod-
ify, with some modification, the common law action of fraud, thus provid-
ing more effective relief for fraud practiced in transactions in stock and
real estate. Advantages afforded to the plaintiff by section 27.01 include:
(a) plaintiff is not required to prove that representations of fact were made
with scienter; (b) plaintiff may bring an action on a false representation
communicated in the form of a promise; (c) damages are measured on a
loss-of-bargain rather than on an out-of-pocket formula; and (d) treble
damages may be awarded when false representations are made willfully.
Part II of this Comment examines the history and elements of section 27.01
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) (The Securities Act of 1933); id §§ 78a-78kk (The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
2. See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Foremost-McKes-
son, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49 (1975); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582 (1973).
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
4. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968). The text of this statute is set
out at note 48 infra.
5. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, §§ 1-3, at 77.
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
in order to illustrate the utility of proceeding under it in appropriate cir-
cumstances.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER RULE lOb-5
A review of state and federal securities regulation illustrates that SEC
rule lOb-5 6 has become the most important antifraud provision.7 Al-
though originally intended by the Securities and Exchange Commission as
a makeshift remedy for fraud in the purchase of securities,' the rule has
expanded rapidly along two lines.' First, it has been judicially construed
to provide an implied cause of action for securities fraud to private plain-
tiffs.'" Secondly, it has been applied to a "startling variety of everyday
transactions."" Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, have
expressed concern over this trend and have limited the scope of the remedy
available to private plaintiffs under rule lOb-5.
The best example of the Court's concern over the expansion of rule lOb-
5 coverage is presented in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.'2 In
Blue Chip, pursuant to an antitrust consent decree that permitted reorgani-
zation of Blue Chip (Old), a substantial number of shares of Blue Chip
(New) was offered to retail users of the company's stamp service who had
not been shareholders in Blue Chip (Old). The offer was attractively
priced, and more than fifty percent of the shares offered were purchased.
Approximately two years later, plaintiffs, who were offerees but not pur-
chasers of the shares, brought an action under rule lOb-5 alleging that the
prospectus was materially misleading because it was overly pessimistic and
discouraged acceptance of the shares. 3 The Supreme Court, relying on
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
7. 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 1.1, at 5 (1967).
8. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922
(1967).
9. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892 (1977).
10. ld See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
11. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 7, § 1.1, at 4; Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 922. See, e.g.,
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (unintentional misrepresentations concerning
promissory notes); Easton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973)
(shareholders of corporation purchasing a leasing business may sue even though not pur-
chasers of stock), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st
Cir. 1966) (former president of corporation allowed to sue for company's failure to inform
him of improvements in process disclosed at meeting that he failed to attend); Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (investor-president of development
concern allowed to recover investment on inaccurate income projection that he was given),
subseq opinion, 333 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1964).
12. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 893-97; The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 262 (1975); Note, Birnbaum.- Revisited and Trium-
phant-Blue Chp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 132 (1975); Note,
Standing Under Rule lOb-5 After Blue Chp Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REV. 413 (1976); Comment,
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.- Failure to Solve the Purchaser-Seller Problem, 70
Nw. L. REV. 965 (1976); Note, Affirmation of the Purchaser-Seller Limitation. Blue Cho
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 29 Sw. L.J. 951 (1975).
13. 421 U.S. at 726-27.
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Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,14 held that private damage actions under
rule 1Ob-5 were limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities. 5
Blue Chip marks the Court's major policy shift from an expansive inter-
pretation of rule 10b-5 to the current trend of limiting the scope of that
rule. In explaining the basis for this shift, the Court stated: "There has
been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a
danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which
accompanies litigation in general."1 6 The potential for vexatious litigation
was attributed to two factors. First, even when a complaint has little
chance of success, it may have settlement value because of its disruptive
effect on normal business activity and the potential for abuse of liberal
discovery provisions.' 7 Secondly, the generalized contours of liability
under rule lOb-5 would present the trier of fact with "many rather hazy
issues of historical fact" that depend almost entirely on oral evidence for
proof, and therefore would be impossible to refute prior to trial.' 8 For
these reasons, the Court concluded that policy considerations required ap-
plication of the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation to suits brought
under rule lOb-5.
The Supreme Court took a second opportunity to restrict the scope of
rule 1Ob-5 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 9 The petitioner, Ernst & Ernst,
an accounting firm conducting an annual audit of First Securities Com-
pany of Chicago (a securities broker-dealer), failed to discover a scheme to
defraud investors implemented by the president and principal stockholder
of First Securities.2" A group of defrauded investors brought suit under
rule lOb-5, alleging that Ernst & Ernst had conducted its audit in a negli-
gent fashion. The district court granted Ernst & Ernst's motion for sum-
mary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material
fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had conducted its audit in ac-
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 2' The Court of Ap-
14. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). Birnbaum established the
requirement that the plaintiff in a private action for damages under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5
must be a purchaser or seller of securities. 193 F.2d at 465.
15. 421 U.S. at 749.
16. Id at 739.
17. Id at 740-41.
18. Id at 743-44.
19. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See generally Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive
Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419
(1977); Note, SEC EnforcementActions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-."
The Scienter Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977); Note, Scienter Requiredfor Civil
Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 28 MERCER L. REV. 401 (1976); Note, Rule 10b-5: Scienter
Displaces the Flexible Duty Standard, 56 NEB. L. REV. 382 (1977); Note, Scienter's Scope and
Application in Rule JOb-5 Actions. An Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW.
925 (1977).
20. More specifically, respondent's action was grounded on the theory that Ernst &
Ernst's failure to discover the president's "mail rule" was negligent. The "mail rule" was the
president's practice of always opening his own mail even if it arrived while he was absent.
Respondent contended that if Ernst & Ernst had discovered the practice, they would have
been forced to report it to the SEC as an irregular procedure that prevented effective audit.
425 U.S. at 190.
21. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 350 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. I11. 1972). Plaintiff
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peals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine
issues of material fact did exist.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and determined that a private cause of action would not lie under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 without an allegation of either scienter or an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.23 Emphasizing the language of section
10(b), the Court stated that "[tihe words 'manipulative or deceptive' used
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b)
was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."24 The
Court, therefore, concluded that section 10(b) was not intended to provide
a remedy for mere negligent conduct.25
Although the Court felt that its scienter analysis sufficiently disposed of
the complaint, the Court nevertheless supplemented its rationale with two
additional arguments. First, the legislative history of section 10(b) indi-
cated a congressional intent to create private actions for damages only for
"illicit practices."26 Secondly, in each instance that express civil liability
was created in the securities acts, Congress specified the standard to be
applied.27 The Court found significant Congress's failure to stipulate a
negligence standard in section 10(b).28 The Court concluded by holding
that since section 10(b) did not prohibit unintentional conduct, rule lOb-5
could not prohibit unintentional conduct because the SEC has no
rulemaking authority beyond that delegated to it under the statute.29
By basing its decision on the legislative history and language of section
10(b), the Court found it unnecessary to discuss considerations of policy.
Nevertheless, it took notice of the policy considerations of the Blue Chip
decision, and expressed concern that a negligence standard would signifi-
cantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who could seek to impose liability on
accountants and other experts.3" The Court feared that this resulting ex-
tension of liability would raise serious policy questions not yet addressed
by Congress.3 '
The most recent mandate from the Court on the scope of rule lOb-5
Olga Hochfelder filed an action on Feb. 19, 1971, in district court against the Midwest Stock
Exchange and Ernst & Ernst. On May 18, 1971, a separate but identical complaint was filed
by plaintiff Leon S. Martin. Midwest and Ernst & Ernst filed motions for summary judg-
ment applicable to both cases. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Midwest Stock Exchange, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in the consolidated appeal.
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1974). Subsequent to the grant of
summary judgment to Midwest, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Ernst & Ernst. The appeals were consolidated by stipulation of the parties and the circuit
court's order of Nov. 13, 1973.
22. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
23. 425 U.S. at 193.
24. Id at 197.
25. Id
26. Id at 206; see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 20-21 (1934).
27. 425 U.S. at 207.
28. Id at 208.
29. Id at 214.
30. Id at 214 n.33.
31. Lowenfels, supra note 9, at 900.
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came in Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.32 In that case Sante Fe Indus-
tries used the Delaware short form merger statute 33 to eliminate the pub-
licly held shares of its ninety-five percent owned subsidiary, Kirby Lumber
Corporation, and return it to private ownership status. Under the statute,
minority shareholders were required either to exchange their shares for
cash in an amount determined by the parent corporation or to pursue their
appraisal rights in state court.34 Plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Kirby,
were dissatisfied with the amount offered by Sante Fe and brought an ac-
tion in federal court alleging violations of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5
relating to the undervaluation of the shares. The district court granted
Sante Fe's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint failed to
allege an omission, misstatement, or fraudulent conduct that would have
affected the shareholders' judgment.35 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed, holding that a complaint alleges a claim under rule
1Ob-5 when it charges, in connection with a short form merger, that the
majority has breached its fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by effect-
ing the merger without any justifiable business purpose.36
The Supreme Court, on review, refused to impose a federal standard of
fair dealing with shareholders, holding that the plaintiffs' claim of fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty did not state a cause of action under section
10(b) or rule lOb-5. 37 The Court relied on two lines of reasoning. Follow-
ing its decision in Ernst & Ernst, the Court reiterated that section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 only reach acts that are "manipulative or deceptive. ' 3s Manip-
ulative conduct was defined as that which is intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market prices and does not include the instances of
corporate mismanagement contemplated by plaintiffs' suit.39 Deceptive
conduct was said to arise from an omission, misstatement, or nondisclo-
sure.' Since the district court found that none of the plaintiffs were
deceived, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 were inapplicable to the short form
merger transaction.4 The Court also examined other factors that weighed
32. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See generally Symposium.- Corporation Notes, Going Private-
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. Y. Green-The Supreme Court Decision in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 30
OKLA. L. REV. 593 (1977); Note, The "New Fraud" Becomes No Fraud- Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 31 Sw. L.J. 739 (1977).
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1975 & Supp. 1978).
34. Id
35. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
36. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. 430 U.S. at 476.
38. 430 U.S. at 472. The court reasoned:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the use of the term
"fraud" in Rule lob-5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction, its interpretation
would, like the interpretation rejected by the Court in Ernst & Ernst, "add a
gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning."
Id
39. Id at 477.
40. Id at 474.
41. Id
1979]
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against permitting the plaintiffs' action to be brought under rule lOb-5. 42
First, the Court observed that allowing this action would not promote the
fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, namely, im-
plementation of a philosophy of full and fair disclosure.43 Secondly, and
more important to the present discussion, the Court believed that this was
a cause of action "traditionally relegated to state law."44 The Court was
concerned that the effect of extending lOb-5 protection to this type of
transaction "would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate
conduct traditionally left to state regulation., 45 The Court was reluctant
to "federalize" the substantial portion of corporation laws that deals with
transactions in securities.'
These cases are instructive in two respects. First, they illustrate the bias
of the Court against expansion of the scope of rule 1Ob-5 and federal reme-
dies in general. Blue Chip and Sante Fe both rely on policy arguments
emphasizing the Court's concern with the evils of vexatious litigation and
the resulting expense to the investing public. Sante Fe further illustrates
the Court's unwillingness to allow federal intervention into areas that tra-
ditionally have been within the realm of state law. Secondly, these cases
are examples of the types of severe substantive limitations recently im-
posed by the Court on private plaintiffs who attempt to bring actions under
rule lOb-5. For instance, the purchaser-seller requirement of Blue Chip
reduces the number of potential plaintiffs with standing under the rule.
The scienter requirement of Hochfelder excludes actions grounded on neg-
ligent conduct and increases the difficulty of proving claims. The Sante Fe
decision operates to limit rule lOb-5 to conduct involving deception or ma-
nipulation and excludes actions based solely on a breach of fiduciary duty.
With the retreat of the federal courts from expansion of application of the
federal securities laws, as evidenced by these cases, state remedies will be
increasingly used to provide redress for defrauded investors.
II. TEXAS BUSINESS AND COMMERCE CODE SECTION 27.01
A. History
The statutory predecessor of section 27.01 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code4 7 was enacted to proscribe fraud in the sale of real estate
42. Id at 477.
43. Id at 477-78.
44. Id at 478 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974)).
45. Id.
46. Id at 479.
47. Section 27.01 provides:
(a) Fraud in a transaction involving real estate or stock in a corporation or
joint stock company consists of a
(1) false representation of a past or existing material fact, when the false
representation is
(A) made to a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter
into a contract; and
(B) relied on by that person in entering into that contract; or
(2) false promise to do an act, when the false promise is
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and stock as a response to fraudulent oil stock promotions and land sale
schemes that had occurred in the lower Rio Grande valley."a The original
statute, article 4004 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes,4 9 was enacted in
(A) material;
(B) made with the intention of not fulfilling it;
(C) made to a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter
into a contract; and
(D) relied on by that person in entering into that contract.
(b) A person who makes a false representation or false promise, and a
person who benefits from that false representation or false promise, commit
the fraud described in Subsection (a) of this section and are jointly and sever-
ally liable to the person defrauded for actual damages. The measure of actual
damages is the difference between the value of the real estate or stock as repre-
sented or promised, and its actual value in the condition in which it is deliv-
ered at the time of the contract.
(c) A person who wilfully makes a false representation or false promise,
and a person who knowingly benefits from a false representation or false
promise, commit the fraud described in Subsection (a) of this section and are
liable to the person defrauded for exemplary damages not to exceed twice the
amount of the actual damages.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 27.01 (Vernon 1968). The statute was originally enacted
at 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, §§ 103, at 77 (Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 3973 (Vernon Supp. 1922),
later renumbered as Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004, repealed, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws ch.
785, § 4, at 2619).
48. The emergency clause of the statute stated:
The fact that there are now in this State a number of fraudulent land schemes,
and that a great number of citizens of this State have been defrauded thereby,
and that there is now no comprehensive law protecting citizens of this State
from being defrauded by false representations and promises, creates an emer-
gency and an imperative public necessity requiring that the Constitutional
rule requiring bills to be read on three several days be suspended and that this
Act take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted.
1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 4, at 77. The legislation as introduced dealt only with fraudu-
lent land sale schemes, but was later broadened to include oil stock promotions. Thompson
v. American Power & Light Co., 192 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1951).
49. The statute provided:
Section 1. Actionable fraud in this State with regard to transactions in real
estate or in stock in corporations or joint stock companies shall consist of ei-
ther a false representation of a past or existing material fact, or false promise
to do some act in the future which is made as a material inducement to an-
other party to enter into a contract and but for which promise said party
would not have entered into said contract, provided however that whenever a
promise thus made has not been complied with by the party making it within
reasonable time, it shall be presumed that it was falsely and fraudulently
made, and the burden shall be on the party making it to show that it was made
in good faith but was prevented from complying therewith by the act of God,
the public enemy or by some equitable reason.
Sec. 2. All persons guilty of fraud, as defined in this Act, shall be liable to
the person defrauded for all actual damages suffered the rule of damages be-
ing the difference between the value of the property as represented or as [it)
would have been worth, had the promise been fulfilled, and the actual value of
the property in the condition it is delivered at the time of the contract.
Sec. 3. All persons making the false representations or promises and all
persons deriving the benefit of said fraud, shall be jointly and severally liable
in actual damages, and in addition thereto, all persons knowingly and wilfully
making such false representations or promises or knowingly taking the advan-
tage of said fraud shall be liable in exemplary damages to the person de-
frauded in such amount as shall be assessed by the Jury, not to exceed double
the amount of the actual damages suffered.
1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, §§ 1-3, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon 1966),
1979]
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1919. It defined fraud in terms of false representations and false
promises,5" and altered the common law fraud action in two respects.
First, the statute modified the common law rule concerning the burden of
proof when the fraudulent representation consisted of a promise rather
than a fact. Under common law the plaintiff was required to prove that
the promisor made the promise with a present intent never to perform it.
51
The legislature shifted the burden of proof by creating a presumption that
a promise to do an act was made falsely and fraudulently when the prom-
ise was given as a material inducement to a contract but not fulfilled
within a reasonable time.52 To rebut the presumption and avoid liability
the promisor was required to show that he had been prevented from per-
forming "by the act of God, the public enemy or by some equitable rea-
son." 53  In Clem v. Evans54 this portion of the statute was declared
unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause of the Texas Consti-
tution.5 5 The court reasoned that the promisor's insincerity makes the con-
duct fraudulent and that fundamental law guarantees the promisor the
right to rebut this charge of insincerity.56 The court therefore concluded
that the legislature had no power to limit the promisor's rebuttal to three
specific defenses as this limitation operated to deprive the defendant of his
property without due process of law.5 7
Secondly, the statute modified the common law measure of damages.
Texas courts apply an out-of-pocket measure of recovery in common law
fraud actions.51 Under this theory the defrauded party is entitled to re-
cover the difference between the value of what he relinquished and the
value of what he received. The predecessor of section 27.01, however, pro-
vided a loss-of-bargain measure of damages that allowed the defrauded
repealed, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 785, § 4, at 2619). Article 4004 differs in one respect from
the language of the statute in 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 3, at 77. The version in Tex.
Gen. Laws provides that "all persons knowingly and wilfully" making false representations
are liable for exemplary damages. The term "knowingly" is omitted from art. 4004, which
provides that "all persons wilfully" making false representations are liable for exemplary
damages. For purposes of this discussion, however, the two versions of the statutes are
treated as identical.
50. Miller, Innocent Misrepresentation as the Basis of an Action/or Deceit, 6 TEXAS L.
REV. 151, 155 (1928).
51. See Chicago T. & M.C. Ry. v. Titterington, 84 Tex. 218, 19 S.W. 472 (1892); Roark
v. Prideaux, 284 S.W. 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926), aft'd, 291 S.W. 868 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted).
52. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § I, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon
1966)) (repealed 1967).
53. Id
54. 291 S.W. 871, 879 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding approved).
55. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19, dealing with deprivation of life, liberty, or property with-
out "due course of the law of the land."
56. 291 S.W. at 872.
57. Id In a companion case, Prideaux v. Roark, 291 S.W. 868, 871 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1927, judgmt adopted), the court similarly found that portion of the statute unconstitutional.
The Clem court believed that this provision also violated the due process clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 2, even though the United States Supreme
Court held otherwise in James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
58. See George v. Hesse, 100 Tex. 44, 46-48, 93 S.W. 107, 108 (1906). See also Miller,
supra note 50, at 156.
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party to recover the difference between the actual value of the real estate or
stock and the value of the real estate or stock if it had been as represented
or promised. 9 The adoption of the statutory loss-of-bargain measure ef-
fectively gave the defrauded party damages for breach of contract in a
fraud action, usually resulting in a more generous recovery than one based
on the out-of-pocket measure.60
The Texas Legislature made several changes in the statute when article
4004 was codified into the Business and Commerce Code as section 27.01.
For instance, the portion of the statute relating to burden of proof in ac-
tions based on a false promise, which had been declared unconstitutional,
was deleted. 61 In addition, the language used in formulating both the in-
ducement and reliance requirements was changed slightly.62 Finally, sec-
tion 27.01 bifurcated the fraud action into portions prescribing the
elements for an action based on misrepresentation of a fact and for an
action based on a false promise.
In an action for misrepresentation of a fact the defrauded party is re-
quired to prove: (1) that a misrepresentation was made; (2) that it was
material; (3) that it was made to induce the party to enter into a contract;
(4) that it was relied on by the defrauded party in entering into a contract;
and (5) that the defrauded party suffered an injury.63 If the action is based
on a false promise, then in addition to these elements the statute requires
the defrauded party to prove that the representor made the promise with
the intent of not fulfilling it.64
59. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 2, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon
1966)) (repealed 1967).
60. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 10, at 133-34 (4th ed. 1971).
61. Compare 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 1, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004
(Vernon 1966)) (repealed 1967) with TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2) (Vernon
1968).
62. With respect to the inducement requirement, art. 4004 required that the representa-
tion be made "as a material inducement to another party to enter into a contract." 1919 Tex.
Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 1, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon 1966)) (repealed
1967). Section 27.01, however, requires that the representation be "made to a person for the
purpose of inducing that person to enter into a contract." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.01(a)(l)(A), (2)(C) (Vernon 1968). A similar change was made in the language of the
statute concerning the reliance requirement. Article 4004 required the plaintiff to demon-
strate that "but for which promise" he "would not have entered into said contract." 1919
Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 1, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon 1966)) (re-
pealed 1967). Section 27.01 requires that the representation be "relied on by that person in
entering into that contract." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(1)(B), (2)(D)
(Vernon 1968).
Although the differences in the language of the two statutes do not appear to change the
substantive requirements of the cause of action under the statute, sufficient differences exist
to warrant identification of the cases decided under art. 4004 and § 27.01. Thus, a paren-
thetical following the citation of each case decided under the statute will identify the version
of the statute under which the case was decided.
Note also that citation to cases brought for fraud in the sale of real estate under the statute
is made throughout this Comment. Since "actionable fraud" is defined in the statute for
both stock and real estate transactions, the real estate cases are equally applicable to actions
for fraud in transactions involving stock. Nevertheless, when a real estate case is cited the
parenthetical will indicate it as such.
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(1) (Vernon 1968).
64. Id § 27.01(a)(2).
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B. Misrepresentation
Section 27.01 defines "actionable fraud" as either a false representation
of a past or existing material fact65 or a false promise to do an act made
with the intention of not fulfilling it.66 Although the clearest case of mis-
representation is the communication of a deliberate or intentional false-
hood, the case law illustrates that the statute embraces much more than
this simple situation. For instance, the common law approach of examin-
ing whether the effect of a particular representation on an ordinary mind
may be deceptive or misleading has been applied in actions brought under
the statute. In Chandler v. Butler67 the purchaser of stock made represen-
tations that he was paying $45.00 per share in response to the seller's in-
quiry concerning the market value of the stock. The seller testified that he
had no knowledge of the market value and that the purchaser's representa-
tion led him to believe that $45.00 per share was the market value of the
stock. The court held that the evasive statement of the purchaser, whether
true or not, constituted an actionable misrepresentation. 68 It reasoned that
a representation literally true was actionable if used to create an impres-
sion substantially false. In this case, the purchaser had superior knowledge
of the value of the stock and knew that the seller was relying on his exper-
tise. Thus, the purchaser was under a duty to make truthful representa-
tions to the seller and had no right to evade, conceal or suppress the truth.
Similarly, if the defendant is under a duty to speak, concealment of the
truth is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. 69 A duty to
speak arises if the possessor of information knows that the other party is
ignorant of the facts and does not have an equal opportunity of discover-
ing the truth.7"
Probably the most frequently litigated issue under the statute concerning
the character of the misrepresentation is whether it constitutes a fact or a
mere expression of opinion. Generally, expressions of opinion cannot be
the basis of an action for fraud under section 27.01.71 For example, in
65. Id. § 27.01(a)(1).
66. Id. § 27.01(a)(2).
67. 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a
transaction involving stock).
68. Id at 398.
69. See Richman Trusts v. Kutner, 504 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ refd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Wink Enterprises, Inc.
v. Dow, 491 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud
in a transaction involving stock). These two cases adopt the approach taken in common law
fraud cases. See Roland v. McCullough, 561 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); American Marine Upholstery Co. v. Minsky, 433 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, writ refd n.r.e.); Moore & Moore Drilling Co. v. White, 345
S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ refd n.r.e.).
70. Richman Trusts v. Kutner, 504 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Moore & Moore Drilling
Co. v. White, 345 S.W.2d 550, 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ refd n.r.e.) (common
law fraud action).
71. The rule at common law is that "false representations are not actionable unless they
relate to a fact susceptible of knowledge which existed at the time the representations were
made, or had existed before that time." Industrial Transp. Co. v. Russell, 238 S.W. 1030,
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Stone v. Enstam72 the plaintiff, a purchaser of stock in Worldcom, Incor-
porated, brought an action under section 27.01 alleging that the president
of Worldcom made fraudulent representations that Worldcom would be in
the black in its first year, and that the stock would sell in the future for
forty to fifty dollars per share. The court of civil appeals, finding no evi-
dence of misrepresentation of a material fact, stated that "[tihe speculative
statements asserting that stock would eventually sell at a high price and
that Worldcom would show a profit in the future are not statements of
material fact presently existing which would constitute fraud under this
section but rather are only statements of optimism and conjecture.",73 Sim-
ilarly, in Ryan v. Collins74 statements that stock was "hot," had "unlimited
possibilities," and was a "solid buy" were found to be mere opinion by the
court of civil appeals. The Ryan court observed that it was "well settled
that in order to constitute actionable fraud the representation complained
of must concern a material fact as distinguished from a mere matter of
opinion, judgment, probability or expectation., 75
When there is an ostensible factual basis for the representation or when
the special knowledge of the representor elevates what would normally be
his opinion to a factual representation, courts will apply a stricter standard
to the determination of whether a particular representation constitutes fact
or opinion. In Wink Enterprises, Inc. v. Dow76 the purchaser of stock in a
bank brought suit on the seller's representation that "the bank was doing
very well" 77 and that "[ilt was a good, sound bank and would continue to
make money. "78 Reversing the trial court's grant of seller's motion for a
directed verdict, the appellate court concluded that the representation in
question was more than an opinion. It reasoned that the statement implied
to the purchaser that facts existed that led the representor to believe that
the bank was in good financial condition.79 Hence, factual issues bearing
on the question of fraud were present."0 Similarly, other courts have
found what would normally be considered an opinion to be an actionable
representation when the representor intended it to be accepted as fact or
when he could have reasonably expected the other party to rely on his
1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1922), aft'd, 251 S.W. 1034 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923,
holding approved), afd, 113 Tex. 441, 248 S.W. 462 (1924). See also Precision Motors, Inc.
v. English, 517 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, no writ); Brooks v. Parr, 507
S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Hazle v. McDonald, 449 S.W.2d 343
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ).
72. 541 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transac-
tion involving stock).
73. Id at 481.
74. 496 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a
transaction involving stock).
75. Id at 210 (quoting Fossier v. Morgan, 474 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1971, no writ)).
76. 491 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a
transaction involving stock).






superior knowledge or skill.8 '
Not all courts follow this approach, however. At least one court has
refused to impose liability absent a clear factual representation even
though the representor had expertise or special knowledge of the subject of
the representation. In Maness v. Reese 2 the sale of a corporation was im-
plemented by a redemption of the seller's stock valued at $200,000. Subse-
quently, the business failed, and the purchaser brought suit, alleging that
the seller and accountants for the corporation made fraudulent representa-
tions that the withdrawal of the $200,000 from capital to effect the stock
redemption plan would not impair the operations of the business. The
court of civil appeals, reversing the lower court, held that the representa-
tions were not actionable, stating that they "certainly entailed business
acumen, judgment and opinion based on many factors, some incapable of
knowledge at the time this transfer was effected." 3 The court, however,
observed that some evidence existed that defendants represented that after
the redemption there would be a certain amount of capital available. The
court noted that such evidence would have been proper inquiry for the
jury.84
At common law it is generally held that the state of mind of a person
making a representation is an existing fact susceptible of actionable mis-
representation so that redress may be had for an expression of opinion
contrary to that entertained by the representor s5 This reasoning is equally
applicable to actions brought under section 27.01. Thus, "expressions of
opinion by a person, made with a knowledge of their falsity and with the
fraudulent intent to induce the other party to act, are actionable" under the
statute.86
81. See Bell v. Bradshaw, 342 S.W.2d 185, 189-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960, no
writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); J.S. Curtiss & Co. v. White, 90
S.W.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd by agr.) (art. 4004; fraud
in a transaction involving stock); Roark v. Prideaux, 284 S.W. 624, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1926) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock), aft'd, 291 S.W. 868
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted). See also Ryan v. Collins, 496 S.W.2d 205, 210
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving
stock), in which the court stated that "[w]here no confidential relationship exists between the
parties, a mere expression of an opinion. . . is not considered to be a misrepresentation of a
material fact," thus implying that an opinion may be actionable if a confidential relationship
exists between the parties.
82. 489 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in
a transaction involving stock).
83. Id at 664.
84. Id.
85. "The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion." Edging-
ton v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] 29 Ch. D. 459, 483. See also Merchandise Mart, Inc. v. Marcus,
483 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972), motion to amend mandate dism'd, 501
S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), writ dism'd w.o.j*, per curiam, 515 S.W.2d 663
(Tex. 1974), mandate returned, 518 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975); Mangum
Road Center v. Disclafani, 450 S.W.2d 130, 135 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Harris v. Sanderson, 178 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1944,
writ ref'd w.o.m.); Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n v. Craddock, 285 S.W. 949, 950 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1926, writ ref'd).
86. J.S. Curtiss & Co. v. White, 90 S.W.2d 1095, 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935,




Section 27.01 requires that the misrepresentation be material.8 7 It ap-
pears that any representation that might affect the value of the stock or
that a reasonable man would consider important in determining a course
of action is material.88 Thus, representations by a buyer or seller of stock
concerning its value have been held to be material.89 Further, representa-
tions regarding the future income that a stock will earn are material. 90
D. Inducement
Article 4004 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes required that the repre-
sentation be "made as a material inducement to another party to enter into
a contract."9' This provision was misconstrued as requiring that the repre-
sentation actually cause or induce the defrauded party to enter into a con-
tract.92 The inducement requirement, however, concerned the intent of the
party making the representation, and not the ultimate effect on the de-
frauded party. The Texas Supreme Court clarified this distinction in West-
cliffCo. v. Wall.93 The court held that "[a] person making a representation
is only accountable for its truth or honesty to the very person or persons
whom he seeks to influence. 9 4
The language of section 27.01 is clearer as it requires that the representa-
tion be "made to a person for the purpose of inducing that person to enter
into a contract." 95 This important limitation on the potential liability of
the maker of a false representation effectively restricts the statute to repre-
sentations made in connection with an actual sales transaction or selling
campaign. Thus, misleading press releases or false financial statements
87. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(1), (2)(A) (Vernon 1968).
88. Bordwine, Civil Remedies Under the Texas Securities Laws, 8 Hous. L. REV. 657,
664 (1971). See also Wheat v. Hall, 535 F.2d 874, 876 (5th Cir. 1971), which applied the test
of "whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in deter-
mining his course of action" to an action brought under federal rule 1Ob-5, § 33 of the Texas
Securities Act, and § 27.01.
89. Bordwine, supra note 88, at 664. See also Crofford v. Bowden, 311 S.W.2d 954
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving
stock); Chandler v. Butler, 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ) (art.
4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
90. Bordwine, supra note 88, at 664. See also Brooks v. Parr, 507 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ) (common law fraud action).
91. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 43, § 1, at 77 (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4004 (Vernon
1966)) (repealed 1967).
92. See, e.g., H.W. Broaddus Co. v. Binkley, 126 Tex. 374, 88 S.W.2d 1040 (1936) (art.
4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate). Additional problems arose with respect to
the phrasing of the inducement requirement of art. 4004. For example, use of the term
"material" with respect to both the inducement requirement and the character of the misrep-
resentation led to confusion. See Connor v. Buckley, 380 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1964, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate). The term "ma-
terial" was omitted with respect to inducement when the statute was codified as § 27.01..
93. 173 Tex. 271, 267 S.W.2d 544 (1954) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real
estate).
94. Id at 546 (quoting Williamson v. Patterson, 106 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1937, writ dism'd)).
95. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(l)(A), (2)(C) (Vernon 1968).
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that are not connected with a prospectus or other selling document proba-
bly would not generate liability under the statute unless the plaintiff could
demonstrate that their purpose was to induce a contract.
E. Scienter
Scienter refers to the underlying intent of the representor to deceive or
mislead. At common law, scienter is present when the representor either
knows that his representation is false or makes the representation reck-
lessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion.96 Sec-
tion 27.01, in two separate contexts, expressly requires that a particular
representation be made with scienter. First, if the representation of a de-
fendant was a promise to do an act, then the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant made the promise with the present intention of not fulfilling it.
9 7
The scienter requirement, in this context, effectively limits the action on a
promise to those situations where the injury arose from an actual intent to
deceive rather than a mere failure to perform a promise. Secondly, per-
sons who willfully make false representations or promises, or knowingly
benefit therefrom, are liable for exemplary damages.98
Scienter is conspicuously absent from the requisites of an action for mis-
representation of a fact under the statute. In light of the existence of the
requirement in the two instances noted above, this omission is a significant
indication of legislative intent.9 9 Indeed, it probably occurred as the result
of the statute's basis in the common law fraud action of the early 1900's.
Although conflict existed among courts concerning whether scienter must
be present for actionable fraud under the common law of Texas, 1"° a long
line of Texas cases consistently held that a party was liable for his misrep-
resentations even though innocently made.' 0 ' It appears that the legisla-
ture adopted this approach, extending it to transactions in stock.' 0
2
Despite the failure of the statute to stipulate a scienter requirement, con-
fusion has occurred in the courts regarding the existence of such a require-
96. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977); Custom Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex. 1974); Oilwell Div., United
States Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex. 1973); Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572,
573 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
97. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2)(B) (Vernon 1968).
98. Id § 27.01(c).
99. Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TExAs L. REV. 1, 13 n.37 (1953).
100. See generally Miller, supra note 50. Compare Wilson v. Jones, 45 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved), Avery Co. v. Harrison, 267 S.W. 254 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1924, judgmt adopted), and Wimple v. Patterson, 117 S.W. 1034 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909,
no writ), with cases cited note 101 infra.
101. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 492, 119 S.W. 1141 (1909); Mitchell v.
Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75 (1849); Booth v. Coward, 265 S.W. 1026 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924,
judgmt adopted); Spencer v. Womack, 274 S.W. 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1925, no
writ); Ford v. Sims, 190 S.W. 1165 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, no writ); Benton v.
Kuykendall, 160 S.W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1913, writ refd); Wells v. Driskell, 149
S.W. 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1912, no writ); Gibbens v. Bourland, 145 S.W. 274 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1912, no writ).
102. See Rick v. Farrell, 266 S.W. 522, 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924, no writ) (art.
4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock); Miller, supra note 50, at 154-55.
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ment.'0 3 In Crofford v. Bowden' °4 the court stated that "[t]o constitute
actionable fraud as defined in the statute . . . it must appear that a mate-
rial representation was made and that it was false; that when the party
made it, he knew it was false, or made it recklessly without any knowledge
of its truth, and as a positive fact."' 5 This court ignored the clear import
of the statute. Section 27.01 operates to incorporate into a contract factual
representations of a party seeking to induce the other to enter into the
contract. Liability is predicated on the existence of a misrepresentation,
not scienter or wrongful intent. Section 27.01 is an extension of warranty
theory to transactions in stock."16 One court, recognizing that scienter was
not a prerequisite to liability under the statute, explained:
[A]n unqualified statement that a fact exists, made for the purpose of
inducing another to act upon it, implies that the one who makes it
knows it to be true and speaks from such knowledge, if the facts repre-
sented do not exist, and the person states of his own knowledge that
they do, and induces another to act upon his statement, the law im-
putes to him a fraudulent purpose.
10 7
Other courts have held that "intent to deceive"1 8 and "knowledge of fal-
sity" 109 of the representation are not required and that "good faith is no
excuse."
110
The divergence in the courts regarding the scienter requirement proba-
bly has arisen for several reasons. First, actions for misrepresentation of a
fact have been confused with actions on a false promise. ' In an action on
a false promise the defrauded party has the burden of showing that the
promise was made with the present intention of not fulfilling it. 112 Care-
103. Keeton, supra note 99.
104. 311 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd) (art. 4004; fraud in a
transaction involving stock).
105. Id at 956. It is interesting to note that two of the cases cited by the court as author-
ity on this point held that scienter was not an element of actionable fraud. See Stroud v.
Pechacek, 120 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1938, no writ); Spencer v. Womak,
274 S.W. 175, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1925, no writ).
106. See Keeton, supra note 99, at 13; Miller, supra note 50, at 154-55. Dean Prosser has
also recognized that the statute is an extension of warranty theory to representations made in
transactions involving stock and real estate. See W. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 107, at 712
n.92 (citing Speer v. Pool, 210 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, no writ), a case
applying art. 4004 to fraud in the sale of real estate).
107. White v. Bond, 355 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other
grounds, 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock)
(quoting United States Gypsum Co. v. Shields, 106 S.W. 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907),
af'd, 101 Tex. 473, 108 S.W. 1165 (1908)).
108. Vredenburgh v. Bachman, 1 I F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1926) (art. 4004; fraud in a transac-
tion involving real estate).
109. Passero v. Loew, 259 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1953, writ retd
n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
110. Roark v. Prideaux, 284 S.W. 624, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926), a19'd, 291
S.W. 868 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction in-
volving stock).
111. An early commentator on the scienter requirement at common law in Texas ob-
served that the leading cases requiring scienter had mistakenly relied on cases in which the
false representation was a promise rather than a fact. Miller, supra note 50, at 159. It ap-
pears that the same confusion has resulted in cases construing § 27.01.
112. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(2)(B) (Vernon 1968).
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less language has been used by some courts in applying this rule. For ex-
ample, in Brooks v. Parr1 3 the court explained that "a stock salesman's
representations in the form of opinions or promises concerning future re-
turns on the stock can amount to actionable fraud if the plaintiff proves
that the representations were known to be false by the salesman making
them when they were made." '14 Although the court was clear on the req-
uisites of actionable fraud and meant to refer only to actions on
promises," 5 the language used has led other courts to believe that the
Brooks court required an intent to deceive for all types of misrepresenta-
tions.' 16
A second reason for the divergence of opinion concerning the require-
ment of scienter under section 27.01 for misrepresentation of a fact is that
the scienter requirement has been a point of continuous confusion under
the common law fraud action." 7 It is interesting to note, however, that a
line of recent Texas Supreme Court decisions appears to have settled the
controversy under the common law in favor of the requirement." 8 In
Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. 1" the court stated that one element
of a fraudulent representation is satisfied if "when the speaker made it he
knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth
and as a positive assertion."' 120 The court merely adopted the elements set
out by the old Texas Commission of Appeals in Wilson v. Texas.12 ' The
Wilson court, however, distinguished between misrepresentation of a fact
and misrepresentation of an opinion, requiring scienter only in the latter
situation. 22 The supreme court failed to recognize this distinction, effec-
113. 507 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ) (common law fraud ac-
tion).
114. Id at 820.
115. The court recognized that
[t]o be fraudulent, the misrepresentation must be one of present or past facts.
Before a promise to do something in the future can be actionable fraud, plain-
tiff must additionally plead and prove that at the very time such promise was
made, the promisor did not intend to carry it out.
id at 819-20.
116. One court stated that "it appears some Texas cases require proof of scienter to es-
tablish actionable fraud. See, e.g., Brooks v. Parr, 507 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974)." Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. See note 100 supra.
118. See Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977); Custom Leasing,
Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 516 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1974); Oilwell Div., United States
Steel Corp. v. Fryer, 493 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1973).
119. 554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977).
120. Id at 185.
121. 45 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, holding approved).
122. The court explained that:
an expert's opinion as to a matter susceptible of knowledge is regarded as a
statement of fact, upon which reliance may properly be placed, and, if it is
made scienter . . . constitutes remediable fraud. . . .The rule is further well
established in this state that, where affirmative representations of fact are
made and designed to be acted upon by another and he does so believing them
to be true when they are false, one making the representations is liable, re-
gardless of his knowledge of falsity or intent to deceive.
Id at 575 (citations omitted); see Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527, 533 n.2 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Wilson court merely took notice of the general
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tively adopting a scienter requirement for all common law fraud ac-
tions. ' 3 Since the legislative mandate prohibits application of the Stone
decision to section 27.01 actions, the statute now appears to provide a
broader cause of action than that available under the common law.' 24
F. Reliance
The reliance requirement ensures a causal connection between the mis-
representation and the injury.' 5 In contrast with inducement, which re-
quires an intent by the representor to influence the actions of the
defrauded party, the reliance requirement focuses on the representation's
actual effect on the defrauded party. In order to recover under section
27.01, the defrauded party must demonstrate that he relied on the false
representation in entering into a contract.' 26 Under common law, Texas
courts require the plaintiff to show that but for the representation, he
would not have entered into the contract. 127 Thus, section 27.01 merely
adopted the common law rule requiring that the representation affect the
defrauded party's course of conduct by causing him to enter into a contract
that he would not have entered into had the representation not been made.
If it appears that the plaintiff was suspicious of the truth of the represen-
tation or that he knew that it was false, the representation cannot be re-
garded as a cause of his conduct or the resulting injury. 128 In this context,
the relative knowledge of the parties on the subject matter of the represen-
rule that an opinion by its very nature is only an assertion of the representer's belief on
which a party has no right to rely.
123. 554 S.W.2d at 185. Even in light of the apparent adoption of a scienter requirement
by the Texas Supreme Court, confusion still exists. Compare Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d
527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with Fredonia Broadcasting
Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978).
124. It is interesting to note that the statute also appears to allow a broader cause of
action with respect to the culpability of the representer than that of § 33 of the Texas Securi-
ties Act. Under § 33, the seller of a security by means of an untrue statement or omission of
a material fact and the person who buys or offers to buy by means of an untrue statement or
omission of a material fact may avoid liability by proving that he could not have known of
the misstatement or omission through the exercise of reasonable care. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) & (B) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). Section 27.01 allows no such
defense and does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant was negligent.
Section 27.01 allows the plaintiff to recover for purely innocent representations.
125. W. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 108, at 714.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(l)(B) (Vernon 1968).
127. See H.W. Broaddus Co. v. Binkley, 126 Tex. 377, 88 S.W.2d 1040 (1936); Buchanan
v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 495, 119 S.W. 1141 (1909); Schmaltz v. Walder, 566 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Neuhaus v. Kain, 557 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); First State Bank v. Olde Colony House,
414 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
One alternative approach would find reliance on the misrepresentation when it acted as a
material inducement to the contract. It would not require that the representation be "para-
mount, or the decisive, inducement which tipped the scales, so long as it plays a substantial
part in affecting the plaintiffs decision." W. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 108, at 715. See also
Hester v. Shuster, 234 S.W. 713, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1921, writ dism'd). The
Texas Supreme Court rejected this approach in H.W. Broaddus Co. v. Binkley, 126 Tex.
374, 378, 88 S.W.2d 1040, 1042 (1936), stating that it was necessary to determine whether the
contract would have been signed without the representations having been made.
128. W. PROSSER, upra note 60, § 108, at 714.
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tation as well as the conduct of the plaintiff will usually be determinative.
Consequently, if the representation is such that both parties are equally
cognizant of its truth, there is no actionable fraud. 29 Further, if a pur-
chaser makes his own free and unhampered investigation with regard to
the subject of the false representations and obtains the information that he
desires, then he is presumed to have relied on his own investigation rather
than the misrepresentation.1 30
Under the common law fraud action, it is not enough that the defrauded
party show that the misrepresentation actually caused him to enter into a
contract. In addition, he must demonstrate that he had the "right to rely"
on the representation of defendant. 3 ' The general rule is that a party has
the right to rely on factual representations that are not utterly unreasona-
ble.' 32 Applying these principles in an action under section 27.01, one
court held that a purchaser of stock was "justified" in relying on represen-
tations concerning the value of stock made by the president of the com-
pany that issued the stock.133 Similarly, under both common law and
section 27.01, a defrauded party's cause of action is not precluded even
though he could have discovered the fraud through a diligent investiga-
tion.134 Thus, it appears that the defrauded party is under no duty to in-
vestigate the truthfulness of the defendant's representations.
G. Persons Liable
Section 27.01 provides that both "a person who makes a false represen-
tation or false promise, and a person who benefits from that false represen-
tation or false promise" are liable for actual damages to the person
defrauded. 35 In addition, the statute provides that both the person will-
fully making the false representation and any person who knowingly bene-
129. Seideman v. Callahan, 34 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, writ
dism'd) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
130. Lone Star Mach. Corp. v. Frankel, 564 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1978, no writ) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); M.L. Mayfield Petro-
leum Corp. v. Kelly, 450 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
131. See Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., 113 Tex. 441, 251 S.W. 1034 (1923); Lewis v.
River Oaks Capital Corp., 466 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Oneal v. Weisman, 88 S.W. 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ).
132. Guitar Trust Estate v. Boyd, 120 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1938,
no writ). It appears that "[t]he plaintiffs conduct must not be so utterly unreasonable, in the
light of the information open to him, that the law may properly say that his loss is his own
responsibility." W. PROSSER, supra note 60, § 108, at 715. The defrauded party is not re-
quired to demonstrate that a reasonable man would have been justified in relying on the
false representations. Bell v. Henson, 74 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1934, writ
dism'd).
133. Crofford v. Bowden, 311 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ refd)
(art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
134. Id at 956, applying this approach to an action for fraud in a transaction involving
stock under art. 4004. For common law cases, see Buchanan v. Burnett, 102 Tex. 492, 119
S.W.1141 (1909); Labbe v. Corbett, 69 Tex. 503, 6 S.W. 808 (1888); Bush v. Stone, 500
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ refd n.r.e.); Trinity-Universal Ins.
Co. v. Maxwell, 101 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, writ dism'd).
135. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 1968).
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fits from it are liable for exemplary damages. 136 The portion of the statute
imposing liability on a party for benefitting from the misrepresentation
was quick to receive criticism. In Ulrich v. Krueger137 the court stated that
it "would hold invalid and void that provision of the act which apparently
makes one merely deriving benefit from the fraud practiced by others lia-
ble not only for all the actual damages suffered, but also for exemplary
damages as well-an unreasonable and discriminatory requirement we
think." 138 The provision, nevertheless, survived the scrutiny of the United
States Supreme Court in James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry.'39
The Court rejected the contention that the imposition of liability regard-
less of the defendant's participation in the fraud violated the due process
clause of the Constitution. 4 ° The Court noted that the statute imposed no
more liability for innocent conduct than the common law or other consti-
tutional statutes. It stated that "[a]t common law every member of a part-
nership is subject to such a liability . . . and often stockholders of
corporations are made similarly liable by statute."''
The statute imposes joint and several liability on both the party who
makes the representation and also the party who benefits therefrom.
142
Privity is not required. Thus, the president of a corporation who made
willful misrepresentations to induce plaintiffs to enter into a contract with
the corporation was held liable to plaintiffs individually even though there
was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the president. 
43
At the time the statute was enacted the common law rule was that a
principal was liable for the false representations of his agent if they were
either authorized by the principal or made in the scope of the agent's em-
ployment.'" Further, Texas courts held the principal liable even though
he did not authorize nor was aware of the false representations, if the prin-
cipal received the "benefit" of the fraudulent acts.' 4  The apparent basis
for liability was that acceptance of the benefit constituted a ratification of
136. Id § 27.01(c).
137. 272 S.W. 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1924, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a trans-
action involving stock). See also Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 615, 359 S.W.2d 876, 881
(1962) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Smith v. Jordan, 220 S.W.2d
481, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1949, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving
real estate); Krueger v. Waugh, 261 S.W. 196, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1924, writ
dism'd) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
138. 272 S.W. at 825.
139. 273 U.S. 119 (1927) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
140. Id at 122-25.
141. Id at 123 (citations omitted).
142. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b), (c) (Vernon 1968). See also McCarty v.
Runkle, 285 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1960) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
143. See R.O. McDonnell Dev. Co. v. Schlueter, 339 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
144. Barber v. Keeling, 204 S.W. 139, 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ);
Foix v. Moeller, 159 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
145. American Nat'l Bank v. Cruger, 91 Tex. 446, 44 S.W. 272 (1898); Delaware Punch
Co. v. Reinarz, 61 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1933, writ ref'd); Barber v.
Keeling, 204 S.W. 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ); Foix v. Moeller, 159
S.W. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
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the agent's acts giving rise to liability.146 The predecessor of section 27.01
codified this ratification approach by extending liability to all persons de-
riving the benefit of the fraud. It was intended, however, as an independ-
ent ground of recovery and not as a replacement for the common law rule
that a principal is liable for fraudulent acts of his agent within the scope of
his authority.'47 The principal, therefore, may be held liable for actual
damages under the statute even though he received no benefit from the
fraudulent acts of his agent.
The statute applies to transactions "involving" stock, and therefore is
not limited to representations made by the seller. Rather, it prohibits
fraudulent representations made by both purchasers and sellers of stock.
Consequently, in Chandler v. Butler148 a purchaser of stock who, for the
purpose of inducing a sale, made false representations to the owner regard-
ing the value of the stock was held liable under the statute.
The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in American Title Insurance
Co. v. Byrd149 may have a significant impact on the types of parties subject
to liability under the statute. Pursuant to an escrow agreement concerning
the sale of a tract of real estate, the title company issued a title insurance
policy to the purchaser of real estate at the expense of the seller. The pol-
icy omitted a reference to two outstanding undivided mineral interests
held by third parties. The purchasers brought suit against the title insur-
ance company under the statute to recover the difference between the
value of the real estate as represented and the value reduced by the out-
standing mineral interests. The Texas Supreme Court held that the statute
was inapplicable to the title insurance transaction because it was not a
transaction in real estate or stock and was only incidental to plaintiffs'
purchase of real estate.150 The court discerned a legislative intent to limit
the scope of the statute in its emergency clause.' 5 Furthermore, the court
stated that the statute is penal in nature and, therefore, should be strictly
construed.152 The decision indicates that courts may be hesitant to impose
liability under section 27.01 on parties not directly involved in a purchase
or sale transaction. In particular, the decision may sound the death knell
on establishment of liability against all but buyers, sellers, and active in-
ducers with an economic stake in the transaction.
146. American Nat'l Bank v. Cruger, 91 Tex. 446, 451, 44 S.W. 278, 280 (1898); Barber v.
Keeling, 204 S.W. 139, 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1918, no writ); Foix v. Moeller,
159 S.W. 1048, 1053 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref'd).
147. Boyd v. Eikenberry, 99 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1936), rev'd
on other grounds, 132 Tex. 408, 122 S.W.2d 1045 (Tex. 1939) (art. 4004; fraud in a transac-
tion involving real estate).
148. 284 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a
transaction involving stock).
149. 384 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1964) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
150. Id at 685.
15 1. Id For text of emergency clause of statute, see note 47 supra.




As previously noted, section 27.01 was intended to modify the common
law measure of damages in fraud actions.' 53 The statute defines "actual
damages" as the "difference between the value of. . .stock as represented
or promised, and its actual value in the condition in which it is delivered at
the time of the contract."' 54 The statute, therefore, allows the successful
plaintiff to recover the benefit of his bargain. In addition, the statute al-
lows recovery of "exemplary damages not to exceed twice the amount of
actual damages" from a person who willfully makes a false representation
or knowingly benefits therefrom.' Thus, a defrauded party who was the
subject of a willful misrepresentation may recover an amount equivalent to
three times the benefit-of-bargain measure of damages.
To recover the statutory measure the plaintiff is required to provide
proof establishing the value of the stock received and the value of the stock
as represented.' 56 The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in While Y.
Bond" 7 illustrates the severe consequences of failing to introduce evi-
dence sufficient to establish the value of the stock as represented. The pur-
chasers of stock in an uranium mining company brought suit against the
sellers who made representations that at some time in the future the stock
would sell "at ten cents per share" and that the purchasers could get "three
or four cents per share" at any time.' The court held that these state-
ments were insufficient to establish the value of the stock as represented,
reasoning that the representations were too vague and indefinite to form a
basis for proof of the value of the stock.' 59 Plaintiffs, therefore, were pre-
cluded from recovering damages under the statute. It is interesting to note
that the court did not allow the purchasers to recover even the purchase
price of the stock, apparently because the purchasers failed to allege that
the price paid was evidence of the value of the stock as represented.
Purchase price, however, has been held to constitute evidence of the value
as represented when there was careful negotiation based on the false repre-
sentations. 160
The statutory measure is not exclusive and does not supersede the com-
mon law measure.' 6 ' Accordingly, if the defrauded party has a large
153. See notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
154. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (Vernon 1968).
155. Id § 27.01(c). "Willfully" has been defined as meaning "knowingly, intentionally,
deliberately, or designedly." J.S. Curtiss & Co. v. White, 90 S.W.2d 1095, 1100 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd by agr.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
156. See Bryant v. Vaughn, 33 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. 1930) (art. 4004; fraud in a transac-
tion involving real estate).
157. 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
158. Id at 297.
159. Id
160. English v. Ramo, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 600, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), rev'd and
modified on other grounds, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973).
161. See Hughes v. Halliday, 471 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ)
(§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); El Paso Dev. Co. v. Ravel, 339 S.W.2d
360, 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction
involving real estate). See also Collins v. Miller, 443 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
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amount of special damages, he is not limited to the amount determined
under the statute. 162 Rather, he can recover his special damages by bring-
ing suit under the common law action.'
63
I. Other Considerations
Scope. Section 27.01 is limited to transactions involving stock' 64 in a cor-
poration or joint stock company.' 65 Although the majority of cases
brought under the statute concern purchases or sales of stock, a few cases
are instructive as to what types of transactions fall within the scope of the
statute. One of the earliest cases addressing this point was Ulrich v. Krue-
ger.'66 In Ulrich the court took a literal approach to application of the
statute and held that the statute did not apply to the purchase of the entire
business and property of a corporation 67 because there was no mention of
stock or shares in the sales agreement.
161
In Thompson v. American Power and Light Co. 169 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the statute to a transaction ostensibly
involving the purchase of stock. Plaintiffs purchased both corporate stock
and a promissory note of Texas Public Utilities Company in the principal
sum of $2,200,000 with $600,000 accrued interest. They later brought suit
under the statute alleging that the balance sheet of the company under-
stated the loss from past operations and failed to disclose that the property
1969, writ refd n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Carruth v.
Allen, 368 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a transac-
tion involving real estate).
162. El Paso Dev. Co. v. Ravel, 339 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ
refd n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate).
163. See Collins v. Miller, 443 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Carruth v. Allen, 368 S.W.2d
672, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving
real estate).
164. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a) (Vernon 1968). By its terms the statute is
limited to transactions in "stock." Therefore, it must be presumed that it applies only to
what has traditionally been known as stock: "a proportional part of certain rights in the
management and profits of the corporation during its existence, and in the assets upon disso-
lution." Thayer v. Wathen, 44 S.W. 906, 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ retd). For this
reason, the statute does not encompass the more expansive concept of a "security." See
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4(A) (Vernon 1964).
165. A joint stock company is an unincorporated association created by agreement gen-
erally providing for centralized management and transferable shares. J. CRANE & A. BROM-
BERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 34, at 178 (1968). Although the Texas Supreme Court has
characterized joint stock companies as a form of partnership, these organizations resemble
corporations in most respects except that they do not provide limited liability to their share-
holders. See Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 64-67, 274 S.W. 554, 558-59 (1925); J.
CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra, § 34, at 178. Further, joint stock companies are treated as
corporations for federal income tax purposes. Burk-Wagoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S.
110 (1925); I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3). For this reason and the absence of limited liability for the
shareholders, joint stock companies are rarely used.
166. 272 S.W. 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1925, no writ) (art. 4004; fraud in a trans-
action involving stock).
167. Id at 825.
168. Id




owned by the company had been fully depreciated for tax purposes. The
court of appeals stated that the transaction was within neither the letter nor
the spirit of the statute. 7 ° It reasoned that although the purchase involved
stock, it was "in a completely subordinate and incidental way, the indebt-
edness represented by the note being in an amount so large as to deprive
the stock of any substantial value, indeed to render it worthless."' 17' The
court, therefore, refused to apply the statute to the transaction, finding that
in substance it was a purchase of a note and not stock in a corporation. In
a more recent decision the Texas Supreme Court refused to apply the stat-
ute to a title insurance transaction, reasoning that it was only incidental to
the purchase of real estate.1 72 These decisions indicate that courts will be
hesitant to extend the scope of the statute beyond a bona fide purchase or
sale of stock. 1
73
Statute of Limitations. No specific statute of limitations was provided for
in section 27.01. Article 5526(4) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, how-
ever, has been judicially construed to limit these actions.' 74 Pursuant to
article 5526(4) and common law principles, an action brought under sec-
tion 27.01 is barred by the statute of limitations if it is filed more than two
years after the defrauded party has acquired knowledge of facts that would
cause a reasonably prudent person to make an inquiry leading to the dis-
covery of fraud.'75 The question of what knowledge of facts will trigger
the running of the statute is ordinarily a factual question. One court has
held that the statute began to run on the date of availability of audited
financial statements from which a reasonable purchaser could have ob-
tained omitted facts. 176 Further, failure to deliver stock certificates on the
date promised was held to put a reasonably prudent person on notice of
the breach and fraud within "two or three months" of that date. 177
170. 192 F.2d at 653.
171. LId at 654.
172. American Title Ins. Co. v. Byrd, 384 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1964) (art. 4004; fraud in the
sale of real estate). For discussion, see notes 149-51 supra and accompanying text.
173. The Texas Supreme Court has characterized the statute as penal in nature and has
found a legislative intent to limit its scope. See American Title Ins. Co. v. Byrd, 384 S.W.2d
683, 685-86 (Tex. 1964) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving real estate); Westcliff Co.
v. Wall, 153 Tex. 271, 274, 267. S.W.2d 544, 546 (1954) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction
involving real estate). It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the statute will be limited
in its application to stock in corporations and joint stock companies. Presumably, the statute
does not apply to interests in general and limited partnerships, or joint ventures. See note
165 supra.
174. Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 407 (2d Cir. 1975); Richard-
son v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Tex. 1972). See also White v. Bond, 362 S.W.
2d 295 (Tex. 1962) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
175. See White v. Bond, 362 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1962) (art. 4004; fraud in a transaction
involving stock); Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ)
(§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving stock); Ryan v. Collins, 496 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
176. Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ)
(§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
177. Ryan v. Collins, 496 S.W.2d 205, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(§ 27.01; fraud in a transaction involving stock).
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Election of Remedies. A defrauded party in a stock transaction may bring
an action under the common law, section 27.01, or section 33 of the Texas
Securities Act.' 78 The Texas Securities Act provides that its remedies are
in addition to other rights of the plaintiff that exist at law or in equity.'79
The comment to the 1977 amendments to section 33 of the Texas Securities
Act explains that "all common law and statutory liabilities outside the
Texas Securities Act, including § 27.01 . . . , remain intact and may be
used along with the Texas and U.S. Securities Act liabilities."180 The rem-
edy provided by section 27.01, therefore, may be utilized in conjunction
with remedies available under both the Texas Securities Act and the com-
mon law.' 8 '
III. CONCLUSION
Section 27.01 possesses a unique combination of elements differing from
both the common law fraud action and the statutory actions available
under either SEC rule lOb-5 or section 33 of the Texas Securities Act. In
this context, the most important feature of section 27.01 is the absence of a
scienter requirement for actions founded on misrepresentation of a fact.
Private plaintiffs unable to demonstrate some form of scienter are pre-
cluded by Ernst & Ernst from recovering under rule lOb-5. Recent deci-
sions of the Texas Supreme Court indicate that the plaintiff bringing a
common law fraud action must prove that the defendant made representa-
tions with knowledge that they were false or recklessly made without any
knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion. Finally, the defendant
in a suit brought to recover damages or rescission under section 33 of the
Texas Securities Act is liable only if he fails to show that he could not have
known of the untruth or omission through the exercise of reasonable care.
Section 27.01, however, does not predicate liability for actual damages on
the presence of wrongful intent or negligence. Rather, section 27.01 per-
mits recovery of actual damages for purely innocent representations.
In addition to the absence of a scienter or negligence requirement, the
statute provides the successful plaintiff with a generous recovery. The de-
frauded party is allowed to recover the benefit of his bargain from a de-
fendant making innocent misrepresentations, rather than the out-of-pocket
measure normally applied in common law fraud actions. The benefit of
treble-damages is available when the false representation is shown to have
been made willfully. This measure of damages should encourage de-
frauded investors to pursue their remedies under the statute.
One final advantage afforded the plaintiff proceeding under section
27.01 is worthy of mention. The statute's basis in common law fraud prin-
ciples makes stating and litigating a cause of action a relatively simple
178. See generally Bordwine, supra note 88.
179. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(M) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
180. Id art. 581-33, comment.




matter. The plaintiff need only show that in a transaction involving stock
a false representation was made to induce him to enter into a contract and
that he relied on the false representation in entering into the contract.'
82
Thus, in light of the advantages afforded the plaintiff proceeding under
section 27.01 and the trend toward reduction of remedies available in fed-
eral courts, defrauded investors should be encouraged to employ the reme-
dies available under section 27.01.
182. Bordwine, supra note 88, at 670-71.
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